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Introduction  
This chapter will examine race and racism and the relations between social ideas (e.g. the existence 
of races; the association of qualities/characteristics with particular racial/ethnic/religious groups), 
social stratification based on these ideas, and discourse. After introductory and contextualising 
sections, where we introduce the historic and conceptual bases of the subject, the empirical and 
analytic sections of the chapter will be structured in such a way that we gradually examine levels and 
details that the reader may not have initially considered. We start with the most obviously 
prejudicial texts, produced and circulated by European extreme-right political parties. Next, we will 
examine a case which appears to have a racial dimension without race being explicitly articulated:  a 
televised interview with the actor Samuel L Jackson, in which the interviewer mistook him for 
Laurence Fishburne. Finally, we will consider British conservative broadsheet newspapers’ reporting 
of a conflagration of the Israel/Palestine conflict (‘Operation Cast Lead’), and the ways they related 
this act of reporting to acts of antisemitism. The chapter will thus progressively move to less 
conspicuous and more dilemmatic waters, and in so doing demonstrate the value of close analysis 
when examining discourse on this topic. 
 
Race and racism  
Conventional, lay understandings of racism – as revealed, for example, in dictionary definitions – 
continue to consider racism to be a system of beliefs, or a (false) mode of thinking. Such 
interpretations underlie classroom discussions with our students too, wherein racism tends (initially 
at least) to be approached as simplified and misrepresentative ideas about Others (typically ‘Others 
with differently coloured skin’); a racist, consequently, is one who agrees with and vocalizes such 
beliefs. Systems of white privilege are especially absent from such conventional understandings of 
racism, given the ways they inevitably highlight the ways that white liberals and even white anti-
racists benefit from racism.  This conventional tendency, “to define racism as a mental phenomenon, 
has continually led to an under-theorisation of the relationship between the mental classification 
involved and the practices in which they are inserted” (Hage, 1998: 29). Donald and Rattansi (1992) 
have made a similar point, arguing that racism ought to be approached from a position which 
assumes that it is “rooted in broader economic structures and material interests” (p.3). From such a 
position: 
Meanings and beliefs do not become irrelevant, but the coherence and falsity of racist ideas 
[are] now ascribed to the function they serve in legitimating social practices that reinforce an 
unequal distribution of power between groups differentiated in racial and/or ethnic terms. 
(Ibid.) 
Explicit in this critique of racism is not just an acknowledgement of the differentiation and 
stratification of ‘racialised’ individuals and groups, but also the very practical functions of racism in 
maintaining inequitable systems of social power and behavioural manifestations of racism. The 
forms that racism takes are not fixed - to the degree that it may be more appropriate to talk of 
racisms.  
 However Anthias (1995: 288) argues that it is important to acknowledge that all racisms are 
“underpinned by a notion of a natural relation between an essence attributed to a human 
population, whether biological or cultural, and social outcomes that do, will or should flow from 
this.” A key dimension of this ‘essence attribution’ is differentiation: the processes through which 
social groups are made ‘Other’. Differentiation simultaneously constructs and applies the (biological 
or cultural) qualities considered important enough to distinguish social groups. It should go without 
saying that such criteria are – somatically, genetically and culturally – arbitrary. (Thus, shoe size is 
not one, but nose size can be; equally, whether one wears a scarf is not one, but whether one wears 
a head scarf can be; and so on.) However, such criteria are socially, politically and historically highly 
relevant since they present the specific – but, equally, the highly adaptable and mutable – features 
that define social groups and, consequently, are used to constitute an in-group ‘Us’ through 
rejecting the out-group ‘Them’.  
Accordingly, racism is “a discourse and a practice whereby ethnic groups are inferiorised” (Anthias, 
1995: 294); such groups can be differentiated in and through their perceived ‘racial’ (that is somatic), 
religious or cultural characteristics (invoking, inter alia, language, clothing, values and practices); and 
the practices of inferiorisation and discrimination may be more or less severe (see Allport 1954 for 
further discussion). To illustrate this point: during the High Middle Ages, whilst skin colour was an 
important criteria for Venetians in differentiating and inferiorising Byzantine troops, it had less 
significance elsewhere in Europe (Bethencourt, 2013: 53): “The illuminated manuscripts 
commissioned by the Castilian king Alfonso the Wise (1221-84) […] represented visible differences 
between Christians and Muslims based more on clothing than physical appearances” (Ibid.). That 
said, although skin colour was considered unimportant (to some, in some contexts), familiar patterns 
and relations of racist structuration were already crystalizing. Thus, by this period, Black Africans 
were being associated with extensive negative characteristics, particularly various barbarous and 
animalistic qualities. For example, in his Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldûn argued that Black people “are 
submissive to slavery, because [they] have little that is essentially human and possess attributes that 
are quite similar to those of dumb animals” (cited in Bethencourt, 2013: 53).  
A further logic of racism – in addition to differentiation and inferiorisation – is that of transmission, 
across time and between members of the vilified human population. It is not sufficient that a human 
population is marked out, deemed inferior and discriminated against; the inferior (and, concomitant 
superior) qualities imputed to reside in populations are additionally presumed and argued to be 
transferred across time – they exist as a birthright, passed from one generation to the next. In 
biological racisms this transmission occurs genetically; in cultural/neo-racisms this occurs through 
socialisation or enculturation. From the vantage point of Anthias’ inclusive definition of racism, 
“Undesirable groups need not be conceptualised in explicit racial terms, but as Others more 
generally. […] This population is endowed with fixed, unchanging and negative characteristics, and 
subjected to relations of inferiorisation and exclusion” (1995: 294).  
The strength of this particular account of racism is that it is not restricted to ‘biological’ racism – in 
other words, it challenges the belief that racism only relates to prejudice and discrimination suffered 
by populations who share specific genotypic or phenotypic characteristics, transmitted as biological 
hereditary. (And, in extremis, that ‘to be racist’ is to discriminate on the basis of skin colour.) The 
assumption that racism is based on physical or ‘biological’ characteristics has often been a sticking 
point in past discussion of prejudice and discrimination suffered by populations marked as religiously 
different.1 Yet, as early as the end of the Middle Ages (in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries), 
ethnicity and religion – and not simply one’s genes, skin colour, etc. – had been built into racial 
theories. In Europe, both Jews and Muslims were subject to ongoing discrimination, based on “the 
idea of ethnic descent: it was expected that they would continue to show the ‘qualities of character’ 
of their ancestors, and would inevitably revert to their former faith. Permanent war on various 
fronts between Christians and Muslims also created a prejudice based on religious allegiance that 
deepened the idea of ethnic descent” (emphasis added, Bethencourt, 2013: 60). The Spanish 
Inquisition institutionalised such racist practice, against both Jews and Muslims. Such insights are 
especially important to take in account in relation to contemporary discourse, wherein “an absolute 
fixing of the difference between cultures” (Meyer, 2001: 33) has, essentially, ensured that “culture 
acquires an immutable character, and hence becomes a homologue for race” (Malik 1996: 150).  
This can be illustrated by considering the re-emergence of the extreme right as a political force in 
Western Europe since the 1990s and particularly after 2001. The European extreme-right includes 
many parties such as the British National Party, the Republikaner in Germany, the Lega Nord in Italy, 
the Swedish Democrats, the French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the Austrian Freedom 
Party (FPÖ), Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (The Movement for a Better Hungary) and the 
Danish People’s party.  These parties share a fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia 
(based on ‘ethno-pluralist’ doctrine) and anti-political-establishment populism (Rydgren 2007). At all 
levels of discourse, their ‘new’ racism is not always expressed in overtly (biologically) racist terms or 
in the terms of neo-fascist discourse. This form of racism, which Taguieff (1988) calls “racisme 
différencialiste” and Wieviorka (1995) calls “racisme culturelle”, stresses the incompatible difference 
between ethnic or religious groups that are described in cultural terms without specifically 
mentioning race or overtly racial criteria.  
Crucially, however, this does not mean that racialised minorities are not the targets of this ‘new’ 
racism, merely that the grounds of their alleged incompatibility with ‘Us’ are expressed using 
‘cultural’ and religious, rather than biological, criteria. Indeed, the historic examples described 
briefly above reveal that there is little ‘new’ about ‘new racism’: cultural, religious, ethnic and ‘racial’ 
characteristics have been used interchangeably to differentiate and exclude for centuries. For this 
reason, we maintain that (biological) racism, antisemitism, anti-Muslimism and other forms of 
ethnicised discrimination (eg against Roma/Sinti) are variations of the same racist logic: 
differentiation, inferiorisation, and presumed transmission of negative characteristics across time 
and between members of the vilified population. 
 
Race, racism and discourse 
This chapter assumes that racism, like all aspects of social life, is in part discursive: it is 
simultaneously a product of and a contributing factor in the continuation of hierarchical and unjust 
social relations. Put another way, racism simultaneously constructs social relations between 
individuals and groups in society – predominantly hierarchies of the sort mentioned above – and, at 
the same time, is constructed by these social relations. This is not to suggest that racisms are wholly 
constructed phenomena – that racist practices are assembled and reassembled “as social actors 
interact with each other and exchange interpretative meanings” (Manning, 2001: 21) – or that 
racism can be collapsed into, and conceptualised wholly in relation to discourse. Rather, it is to 
suggest that racism, like all social phenomena, should be approached in relation to questions of 
structure and agency typical of critical social analysis. Such a position focuses upon, and aims at 
illuminating, the subtle interplay between the economic, the political, the social and the symbolic 
(see Golding and Murdock, 2000), and so reveals that racism and racialization are “criss-crossed by 
ethnic, national, gender, class and other social constructions and divisions” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015: 
578). The cultural studies and critical race analysis of theorists such as Robert Miles, Stuart Hall, 
Étienne Balibar and Colette Guillaumin “conceptually integrate[s] the structural and discursive 
aspects of racism”, theorizing “how stereotypes, racist images and metaphors - the totality of racism 
as an ideology in the strongest sense - are socially reproduced and institutionalized as part of the 
superstructure of a social formation […] how this superstructure is retroactive related to 
exclusionary practices and understand how racism, understood not as a tool but a social relation, 
produces racialized identities” (Opratko & Müller-Uri, 2014: 7). 
The grammatical processes described in Anthias’ account of racism above – ‘conceptualised’, 
‘characterised’, ‘endowed’ – point to the significant role that discourse plays in racialization, in terms 
of both the enactment and the reproduction of racism. As van Dijk et al (1997: 165) have argued, 
“racist talk and text themselves are discriminatory practices, which at the same time influence the 
acquisition and confirmation of racist prejudices and ideologies”. Similarly, Wodak and Reisigl (2015: 
576) point out: 
Racism, as both social practice and ideology, manifests itself discursively. On the one hand, 
racist attitudes and beliefs are produced and promoted by means of discourse, and 
discriminatory practices are prepared, promulgated, and legitimated through discourse. On 
the other hand, discourse serves to criticize and argue against racist opinions and practices, 
that is, to pursue anti-racist strategies. 
Van Dijk (2004: 352-3) identifies three main topical clusters in racist discourse: the differences of 
Others, and so their dissimilarity to Us; the ways that the behaviour of Others breaches Our norms 
and values; and topics constructing Them in terms of threat. There is a rich tradition of studies 
describing the structure and function of xenophobic discourse (van Dijk 1984, van Dijk et al, 1997, 
Quasthoff 1987, Billig 1991, Essed 1991, Wetherell and Potter 1992, Reisigl and Wodak 2001), its 
diffusion through the mass media (Jäger and Link 1993, Jiwani & Richardson, 2011, Richardson 2004, 
2009, van Dijk 1991, Wodak and Forchtner 2014, Wodak and Matouscheck 1993), and its semantic 
organization in political discourse (Richardson & Colombo, 2013, 2014, van Dijk 1997, van der Valk 
2002, 2003). The accomplishment and negotiation of prejudiced/unprejudiced identities has been 
documented in several studies (cf. Edwards 2003, Rapley 2001), as have the processes through 
which those designated as ‘Others’ are represented in discourse (Augoustinous, Tuffin and Rapley 
1999, Tileagă 2006, Verkuyten 1998, 2001,Wetherell and Potter 1992, Wodak and Matouscheck 
1993).  
Extensive research in the critical discourse analytic tradition has focused on the crucial role exerted 
by the elites in the production, the diffusion and legitimation of both overt and covert forms of 
xenophobia and racist discourse over time (Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000). This chapter now turns 
towards the discourse of such elites, examining: first, two leaflets produced by European extreme-
right wing political parties; second, an interview broadcast on the US television network CNN; and 
third, the opinions of conservative Broadsheet newspapers on Israeli ‘Operation Cast Lead’ (the war 
in Gaza, 2008–09), as represented in their editorials.  
 
Case 1: Extremist political discourse  
The core exoteric message of the extreme right amounts to a base opposition to immigration and, 
frequently, settled minority ethnic communities.2 Here, we present a leaflet (also produced as a 
poster) which had an impact on both an anti-Muslim referendum in Switzerland and on propaganda 
produced by other European extreme-right parties (see also Wodak, 2015).3 In the past two decades 
the Swiss People’s Party has established itself as one of the most powerful far- right wing parties in 
Western Europe. The SVP advertising is distinctive in the way that it uses graphic illustrations rather 
than the more widespread and traditional photos. Their posters/leaflets generally contain very few 
words; the core of the message is communicated visually, typically accompanied by a brief slogan.  
On these images, silhouettes of minarets are pictured superimposed over the national flags of 
Switzerland and Britain.4 As with other nationalist political discourse (extremist and otherwise) the 
flags clearly act as metonyms for their respective nations (see Billig 1995); the meaning potential of 
the minarets, on the other hand, is a little more complex. Viewed in conjunction with the veiled 
woman they function, firstly, to represent Islam in a metonymic replacement of a building by the 
faith of the people using the building. However, they also act to represent a more specific process – 
a process through which, in the view of these parties, their respective national spaces are gradually 
being taken over by Muslims. Combined with the linguistic element of the leaflets (either the 
imperative “Stopp” or the “Facts” in the BNP leaflet), it is clear that these respective parties view the 
presence of Islam in the(ir) national space as objectionable. Oskar Freysinger, the SVP Member of 
Parliament, has confirmed as much – that their campaign is directed not at Muslim buildings of 
worship in themselves, but against minarets as a “symbol of a political and aggressive Islam” (quoted 
in Betz, 2013: 73). Political discourse, in both the news media and public policy, has constructed 
Islam and Muslims as a threat (Poole 2002; Richardson 2004). The leaflets therefore recall the 
widespread questioning - by both politicians and mainstream news media – of whether Muslims can, 
or should, be integrated into European society. 
The placement of these fantasy minarets over the flags suggests they are either piercing through the 
flags or have been imposed, or built on top of them. The suggested violence of this process is 
heightened by the ways the minarets evoke spear-tips, or perhaps the cones of missiles.5 Given the 
wide variety of minaret designs, they didn’t have to be this ‘sharp ended’, suggesting that this choice 
and its meaning potential – weaponry – is deliberate. Indeed, minarets, in the view of the SVP’s 
Freysinger, have an “imperialist connotation” (Betz, 2013: 73). This meaning is picked up explicitly in 
the linguistic material included on the BNP leaflet, where an overtly militaristic lexicon of war 
(bayonets, helmets, barracks and army) is invoked as part of a discourse of conquest – 
“Islamification” being the putative goal of Turkey and, pars pro toto, of Muslims in general. 
(Otherwise this process would have been named ‘Turkification’, rather than the more general 
“Islamification”.)  The rhetoric of conquest and colonisation, the negative prosody of the terms 
employed to substantiate the standpoint and, thereby, the threat that They are taken to pose to Us, 
work to substantiate and ‘naturalise’ the stance of these parties as defensive rather than aggressive 
and driven by base antipathy towards (all) Muslims.  
However, the leaflets do not simply suggest that “Islamification” is a threat that will affect Us all in 
the same way. The presence of the second key pictorial element of these leaflets works to implicitly 
suggest a more specific battleground: the bodies of women. ‘The Veiled/Concealed Muslim woman’ 
has become part of a visual iconography of anti-immigrant discourse in general, and anti-Muslim 
discourse in particular, that has been developed by European parties of the right (Durham, 2015). 
The leaflets position women – and the bodies of women specifically – as sites where this conflict 
between Islam and Us is played out. The BNP have pushed this argument to the forefront of their 
propaganda campaigns, to the extent that they argue, more or less explicitly, that ‘we need to 
defend our women, otherwise they will end up looking like this’ (Jiwani & Richardson, 2011; 
Richardson, 2011; Richardson & Wodak, 2009). That is, women’s bodies are invoked, in a pars pro 
toto synecdoche, as the site for this putative process of colonisation (or Islamification) and 
reconquest. This battle for control over (Our) women and (Our) women’s bodies utilises and 
subverts a liberal discourse of gender equality, apportions women’s rights as the purview of 
nationalist men and objectifies the very women that it claims to honour. ‘Nationalist’ (that is, 
extreme-right wing) men are positioned as protectors of Our women – the passivized, embodied 
nation space – and ethnic managers with the power and responsibility to reject Islam. 
 
Case Study 2: Implicit racism 
As Case Study 1 has demonstrated, ‘thinly veiled’ racism remains part and parcel of European and 
Western politics. Indeed, at the time of writing this chapter, the frontrunner for the Republican 
nomination for the president of the United States considers a full-scale ban on Muslim people 
entering the country (Guardian, 2015a), and the Danish parliament adopts law approving the seizure 
of asylum seekers’ assets worth more than $1,453 (Guardian, 2016). Meanwhile, young black men 
killed by US police was at highest yearly rate in 2015, with the cohort’s policed-involved death being 
five times higher than for white men of the same age (2015b).  
Having said that, the fact that even political parties that publish or propagate blatantly racist rhetoric 
are unlikely to describe themselves or their messages as racist, demonstrates that racism has also 
become taboo in modern Western discourse. One outcome of this, of course, was demonstrated 
above as we examined how racist intentions and aims now have to be expressed through linguistic 
and visual codes. In what follows, Case Study 2 now engages with a second outcome: implicit or 
inadvertent racism. 
In a live interview on 10 February, 2014, American actor Samuel L. Jackson (SLJ) should have been 
interviewed by CNN host, entertainment reporter Sam Rubin (SR), about his recent movie RoboCop. 
The interview turned out to be about something else.6   
 
1 
2 
SR .hhH uhh .hh I, >I tell y’u what< you::  workin for Ma:rvel, the super bowl commercial 
did you get a lot o’ reaction to tha’ super bowl commercial? 
3  (1.9) 
4 SLJ What super bowl commercial. 
5  (3.0) 
6 SR O:h, you know wha: t  I didn- nu- bu- my mistake I,= 
7  =[          >you know wha-<       (.) deh.] 
8 
9 
SLJ   [> D’you know what<    (.) See:,]  (.) yo:u? (.) yo:u’re as crazy <as the people on 
Twitter.= 
10 SR =Righ-= 
11 SLJ =I’m not Laurence Fishburne. 
12  (0.9) 
13 
14 
SR That’s my fault (.) I know that (.) that w’s my fault I:, my mistake. (.) >You know 
what,<=  
  
As we see, the interview starts with what is consensually established by both participants as Rubin 
confusing Jackson with fellow actor Laurence Fishburne. Something therefore has happened. 
Yet what, exactly, is this “something”? What has happened? Has he confused two human beings, 
two actors or two black actors? Rubin immediately offers an apology and does this in terms of 
having made a “mistake”. This remains his position throughout the interview, repeatedly apologising 
yet repeatedly apologising for making a “mistake” (l. 40) and being “dumb” (l. 33). As such, he 
implicitly categorizes the event of confusion as a matter of accident and, at worst, a matter of 
unprofessional conduct – no offense, so to speak. 
On one level, this is in line with Jackson’s reference to Rubin being “as crazy as the people on 
twitter” (ll. 9-10). This formulation conveys no additional understanding and therefore does not 
identify the source of his outrage. His next interruption, however, clearly does: 
13 
14 
SR That’s my fault (.) I know that (.) that w’s my fault I:, my mistake. (.) >You know  
what,<=  
15 SLJ =We don’t all: look ali:ke. 
16 SR  (    ) you’re e[xactly      right. 
17 SLJ                           [We may be all:= 
18  =black and fa:mous (.) but we a:ll don’t look ALI:KE= 
19 SR =I’m I’m I’m guil[t:y.  
20 SLJ                              [Uh::: 
21 SR [I’m] 
22 SLJ [You]’re busted. 
23 SR I’m guilty. 
24  (1.0) 
25 SR Ri:ght, 
26 SLJ Ye- 
27  (0.7)  
28 SR °That’s right. °  
29  (0.5) 
 
Clearly, then, what happened, in Jackson’s understanding, is more than a mere accidental confusion 
around the identity of two celebrities; he is not hurt as a famous actor and is not (just) angry on his 
own behalf. As he makes relevant the race he has in common with Laurence Fishburne, he also 
makes it clear that the case is not simply that two actors have just been confused, but that two black 
actors have just been confused. Indeed, by emphatically repeating the scalar quantifier “a:ll” twice, 
he immediately expands the perceived mistake as a perceived insult to the whole black community . 
This way, his anger too gets transformed from an egoistic rant to righteous outrage over past and 
present mistreatment of the black people. 
Significantly, however, this important if implicit change in Jackson’s rhetoric is left unattended to by 
Rubin. He repeatedly continues to own up to his “mistake” – without specifying what he considers 
his “mistake” /“fault” to be and what exactly he is “guilty” of. As such, though explicitly agreeing 
with Jackson that he (i.e., Rubin) did something wrong, Rubin may be seen as trying to implicitly 
accomplish two acts: first, disagreeing with Jackson by reflectively characterizes his own action as an 
accidental mistake and, therefore, the non-specific confusion of any two faces; and second, turning 
the tables by reflectively presenting the enraged Jackson as the bully. 
What we see during the interview is the constant repetition of precisely this dynamic of discourse: 
there is explicit agreement between Jackson and Rubin that something happened but there is 
implicit disagreement as to what exactly happened. 
 
40 SR =My mistake, my: mistake. I apologise. Really my big mistake.  
41  Let’s talk abo[ u     t               u-] 
42 SLJ                            [There must be] a ve:ry short li:ne for your job= 
43  =[<outside] there.> 
44 SR   [I:’ l l    s a y]  
45 
46 
 Now there’s somethin- uh ha:h .HH it probably would not be hard to get another person 
to sit right here.  
47  Let’s ta:lk about RoboCop,= 
48 SLJ = Oh:: He::ll: no::. 
 
Jackson keeps implying that what happened connotes or even enacts a hurtful racial stereotype 
whilst Rubin keeps implicitly denying it both by referring to a non-specific “mistake” and by pushing 
the interview to the new and supposedly more important topic of Jackson’s film RoboCop. The 
important message here is that RoboCop is more important than a “mistake” Rubin would have 
made or him being just “dumb”. Similarly, even a ”big mistake” is no warrant for Jackson’s 
aggressively interrupting Rubin countless times, let alone abusing him as it happens in lines 43-44. A 
possible act of racism, on the other hand, is. But Jackson does not offer an explicit alternative to 
Rubin’s non-specific “mistake”, and as such starts turning from a victim of a “mistake” to a 
perpetrator of more or less unwarranted aggression. 
Arguably, there is one exception to this dynamic during the interview. In a sarcastic move to prove 
his point, Jackson starts to list the TV commercials in which black actors other than him feature, 
repeatedly adding that “I am not that guy. [...] I am not that guy either.” Towards the end of this 
sequence, something interesting happens: 
 
86 SLJ [There’s a heavier= 
87 
88 
90 
91 
 =weight black guy that’s like putting ca:sh down in the seats in a, in a baseball  
stadium but he’s a:lso the black guy that turns off (.) the ((silence for 0.3s, as if 
recording was stopped)) house, the water and the li:ghts .hh when his kid tells him  
the ho:use is cool. 
92 SR Righ(h)-= 
93 SLJ =I’m not that guy either.  
94  (0.5) 
95 SR .HHa? (0.6) Do we wanna do a list of all the people that you’re not?= 
96 SLJ =And I’ve actually never done a MacDonald’s o:r a Kentucky Fri:ed Chicken= 
97  =[commercial.  
98 SR   [Uh(h)  
99  Fa:ir enough.   
100 SLJ I know that’s su:’prising.  
101 SR Right. (1.2) Fair enough, fair enough.  
102  (0.8) 
103 SR Uh: (0.4) to the ori[ g i nal  u h : : : 
104 SLJ                                  [And I’m the o:nly= 
105  =black gu:::y (0.6) in RoboCop that’s not a cri:minal.  
  
For once, Rubin’s rhetorical strategy changes in line 95. From an apologetic yet non-specific and non-
committal “that’s right”, “my mistake”, “you are right”, he changes to a more active way of re-
categorizing the “mistake” he made, as he teasingly asks Jackson the question: “Do we wanna do a 
list of all the people that you’re not?” In other words, he ignores Jackson’s act of enlisting exclusively 
black people for a minute or so. Interestingly, it is precisely at this point that Jackson too becomes 
more overt about the exact source of his anger. Namely, his rant concludes at the point where he 
asserts who he actually is: “And I’m the o:nly black gu:::y (0.6) in RoboCop that’s not a cri:minal.” (ll. 
104-105) By this, he broadens the context of his utterances beyond the studio. His problem becomes 
not just the incident that has just happened in the studio, but an America which still readily 
countenances representing/consuming black people mostly as criminals. This, incidentally, is where 
the detour finishes before the participants start to discuss the actual topic the interview was 
assigned to cover. 
From the perspective of this chapter, the tragedy of this encounter is not simply that it is still 
possible to do racism on mainstream television. Rather, the tragedy is that whilst everything in this 
interview happened in front of our eyes, it still somehow happened in darkness. That is, whilst a 
hurtful racist stereotype with the connotation that the skin colour of black people matters more 
than their individuality was objectively enacted, and whilst both participants immediately recognized 
this transgression of morality, they could not incorporate this objective state of affairs in their 
discourse. Racism was there – but still somehow not there. Not there for Jackson to explicitly spell 
out, and not there for Rubin to explicitly own up to or deny. As such, rather than the fact of racism 
that occurred, it was the discourse around it which created a taboo. A topic, that is, which is there to 
be seen, but not there to be touched, to be discussed, to be engaged with, and ultimately to be 
genuinely changed.  
  
Case Study 3: Racism as threat 
So far, we have encountered a case where racism was clearly intended as such, and one where, 
arguably, it was less about acting out a conscious intention and more about (racialised) 
misrecognition. This combination of the power of racism and its occasionally unintentional nature 
has led to some distinct developments in contemporary discourse of racism which can be 
categorized as ‘racism as dilemmatic’. In what follows, an example of this will be presented, drawing 
on some extracts from British conservative broadsheets’ editorial engagement with the first Gaza 
war between Israel and Hamas (cf., Kaposi 2014, 2016). 
Before doing so, however, some remarks are apropos regarding the coming case study. The previous 
cases dealt with issues of racism; the present one concerns antisemitism. Whilst antisemitism may 
be considered simply to be a specific instance of racism, arguments abound that it is, in fact, sui 
generis, as the unique nature its ultimate manifestation, the Holocaust, attests (cf., Wodak, 2015: 
97-124; Bauer, 2002: 1-68). In addition, as the coming examples will bear out, the existence of an 
officially Jewish state (the State of Israel) leads to further ambiguities. Whilst criticism is a legitimate 
and necessary element of politics, it is easy to see how such acts with regard to the State of Israel 
may possibly stem from antisemitic intentions or even lead to anti-Semitic effect (cf., Kaposi, 2014): 
15-19). 
It is with these dilemmas in mind that we ask our reader to read the following paragraph:  
The first reaction of most commentators was that the air attacks on Gaza were 
unnecessarily savage. The deaths of nearly 300 Palestinians, including civilians, seems 
disproportionate to the small number of Israelis killed by rocket attacks. Hamas was 
not expecting retribution on this scale, but we can be sure that it will extract the 
maximum possible propaganda advantage from the slaughter. Israel’s enemies in the 
liberal West are already pinning the blame squarely on ‘Zionists’. So are most 
Muslims. (Daily Telegraph, 29 December 2008) 
Interestingly, the Daily Telegraph’s first paragraph on the war starts not with the presentation of the 
conservative newspaper’s stance on the morality of the war, but with the exposition of an 
alternative political-moral position to what will be revealed as the newspaper’s own. Why is this 
alternative position relevant? Why is it important to cite those “commentators” who see the war as 
“disproportionate” and “unnecessarily savage”?  
As their opinions are discounted as mere “’first reactions”, it appears that it is not so much their 
intellectual worth that makes important. Rather, it seems relevant because these gut-reactions 
might be taken as embodiments of political-moral dispositions. Who are these people (“most 
commentators”)? Why are they jumping to condemn Israel’s conduct as “savage” and 
“disproportionate”? The paragraph concludes by naming them as “Israel’s enemies in the liberal 
West” as well as “most Muslims”. More importantly, though, we also learn that these groups’ 
ultimate account is to put the blame “squarely on ‘Zionists’”. It is not for nothing that the Telegraph 
uses scare quotes to refer to Zionists. First, given that arguing for the Jewish people’s collective right 
to a homeland/state certainly does not equal arguing for the Jewish state’s army sustaining an 
offensive on Gaza, Zionists may or may not have supported the war. Second, the war was launched 
by the Israeli Defense Forces, instructed by an Israeli government carrying the democratic mandate 
of the Israeli people. Political-moral responsibility may belong to them. The designation Zionist, 
however, implicates many millions of people living outside Israel with certainly no direct political 
responsibility for the events. 
What is more, quite apart from the question of whether Zionism would warrant an accusation of this 
sort, it is not an idea but a group of people that is designated. And if so, we might infer that at the 
core of putting the “blame squarely on ‘Zionists’” is a motive to blacken not an idea at all, but an 
ethnic-religious community. And by the same token, what the Telegraph’s scare quotes around the 
word “Zionist” appear to alert us to is that by blaming “Zionists” they actually mean to blame the 
Jewish community. The shadow of the imagined “other”, in the presence of which the Daily 
Telegraph’s account of the war starts, is, therefore, the shadow of antisemitism. 
Interestingly enough, the role of the “other” equally emerged in the argumentation of the other 
conservative British broadsheet, The Times. To examine this, let us look at a remarkable paragraph 
where the newspaper appears to formulate firm criticism of Israeli action. 
White phosphorus is illegal under international law when used in built-up areas, but a 
legitimate weapon of war when used to provide cover for troops in open country. 
There is scant evidence of the IDF using it deliberately against civilians, but northern 
Gaza, where the fighting is concentrated, is one of the most densely populated places 
in the world. Civilian casualties were inevitable, and the deep burns that white 
phosphorus can cause are virtually untreatable. The longer that the IDF equivocate 
about its use, the more ammunition they hand to those who would accuse them of 
war crimes. (The Times, 16 January 2009) 
This is the concluding paragraph of The Times’ editorial criticism of Israel’s use of white 
phosphorous.7 It is also a very odd paragraph. It features two premises and a conclusion that 
seem to be in a gross mismatch. The newspaper argues that white phosphorous is illegal when 
used in built-up areas, and that Israel appears to be using it in “one of the most densely 
populated areas in the world”; but instead of concluding that IDF’s conduct of war needs to be 
independently investigated, it merely calls for less equivocation on its part. 
Puzzling as it is, what is of importance for the purposes of this chapter is that where we would 
expect a call for independent investigation into Israel’s apparently illegal use of a weapon (and 
hence, by definition, a possible war crime), we encounter yet another figure of the Other. 
Namely, not only does The Times refrain from substantial criticism of Israeli conduct, but 
raises the spectre of Israeli equivocation providing “ammunition [...] to those who would 
accuse them of war crimes.”  
Thus, just as in the case of the Telegraph, the presence of an ‘Other’, an alternative political-
moral position, is therefore relevant to The Times’ political-moral perspective.8 What is more, 
and again in line with the Telegraph, that ‘Other’ appears to be a rather suspect character; 
where we might have expected the activity of an independent and impartial investigation of a 
factual nature, we find the act of “accusation”. Those people are not interested in finding out 
facts about Israel, but in accusing it. And, as a corollary, they are not interested in the 
description of the world, but attempt some act for which the information they get is 
“ammunition”. That is, metaphorically, they attempt a military activity against Israel. 
Who exactly are these people? And why do they do what they are doing? It is difficult to 
obtain more information from the passage. For a more precise description, we might have to 
turn to an earlier editorial from The Times. The following passage concludes the conservative 
newspaper’s first critical exposition of Israel’s use of white phosphorous: 
 
[...] Israel has a powerful ally in the United States.  
Its critics are wont to condemn this alliance as a Jewish axis blind to heart-rending 
realities in Gaza and to the sacrifices necessary for peace.  
No one can be unmoved by the suffering witnessed by the Norwegian surgeon who 
texted friends to tell them ‘we’re wading in death, blood [and] amputees’. But the 
way to end it is not to abandon Israel. It is to defeat Hamas. As Washington 
contemplates an opening to Iran, its reluctance to condemn Israel is not ideological 
but rational. The alternative would be to open talks with Tehran while its proxy in 
Gaza still threatened much of Israel with Iranian-built rockets. (The Times, 10 January 
2009)  
The explicit referent of the ‘Other’ here is Israel’s “critics”. This is a category that, despite 
strong words about Israel’s use of phosphorous, The Times clearly doesn’t belong to. What we 
learn about these critics is that their preferred way of ending the suffering in Gaza would be to 
“abandon Israel”, and that they condemn the US-Israel alliance as a cold-hearted “Jewish 
axis”. The first attribute could perhaps in itself and in a different context come under the 
umbrella of anti-Zionism; the second though is a clear instance of antisemitism as it invokes 
the anti-Jewish trope of a worldwide and malicious Jewish conspiracy responsible for the 
suffering of the world. In this remarkable paragraph concluding The Times’ position on Israeli 
use of white phosphorous, then, Israel’s “critics” turn out to be plain and simple antisemites. 
No wonder, perhaps, that the conservative newspaper would go out its way not to be counted 
amongst them. 
To summarize, when putting forward editorial arguments on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
both British conservative broadsheets found it relevant to refer to an alternative political-
moral perspective to their own -- and that alternative appeared to be a complete non-
alternative since, in both cases, it turned out to be antisemitic. This meant that the 
newspapers could not, and did not have to, engage with the argumentative position of the 
Other that was critical towards the conduct of Israel. 
Indeed, as pointed out earlier, it may be the case that the prima facie political nature of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves up a useful cover for the airing of antisemitic (or anti-
Muslim) perspectives otherwise undesirable in public discourse (cf., Harrison 2006; Rosenfeld 
2006). At the same time, the facts that, first, when British conservative broadsheets 
introduced a perspective critical of Israel’s conduct it inevitably proved to be antisemitic; and, 
second, that The Times itself explicitly dubbed “Israel’s critics” as antisemitic, might make us 
feel uneasy when antisemitism (or anti-Muslim) is rhetorically invoked in political debates. 
Namely, as argued by a number of authors (Bunzl 2007; Butler 2004), through calculation or 
genuine fear it clearly closes down political-moral imaginaries by branding them as 
antisemitic/anti-Muslim. As such, not only does it hinder the solution of a political conflict like 
that in Israel-Palestine, but will contribute to the taboo where racism does not disappear, only 
becomes impossible to be touched, discussed, engaged with and transformed. 
 
Conclusion 
In three case studies, this chapter has examined what we think are three prominent ways in which 
racism features in contemporary Western public discourse. The point that we tried to make was that 
while in the West the idea of racism (as opposed to its practice) has by and large become taboo, 
racist discourse nonetheless operates on three levels.  
With our first Case Study we demonstrated how racism can still be invoked in an essentially explicit 
form in extreme right-wing discourse. Of course, since racism is variously proscribed in 
contemporary politics, racist discourse might have to be coded to a greater or lesser extent, and/or 
package its hateful message in appealing contemporary forms (see Wodak & Forchtner, 2014, for 
analysis of comics produced by the FPÖ, for example). But nevertheless, such discourses constitute a 
’thinly veiled’ and by and large explicit version of political racism.  
Second, the idea of racism having become taboo has led to developments where racism is not only 
coded and implicit, but arguably unintentional. This means that racists do not simply seek to deceive 
the mainstream public and communicate to audiences with coded messages, but rather that racism 
manages to deceive the very self that emits it. We offered Case Study 2 as an example of this, 
showing not only how racism can be implicitly invoked in public discourse, but also how it becomes 
virtually impossible to discuss: it can be seen by everyone but cannot be touched. 
Our third example further developed this line of thinking. In Case Study 3, the issue at stake was the 
threat of racism and the awareness of the ways it is perceived to contaminate political discourse. 
The conservative broadsheets analysed were extraordinarily wary of not becoming (or being 
perceived as, or accused of being) racist – to the extent that it stopped them from fully developing 
critical lines of political thinking. As such, they demonstrated another way that racism, banished as 
taboo, comes back to haunt modern Western societies: from a system of ideas and practices 
legitimating the stratification of society, it becomes a fear of thinking and criticism which, once 
again, petrifies the political status quo and immunizes it from change. [7069 words] 
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1
 It behoves us to point out that Islamophobia does, indeed, “pose a challenge to traditional understandings of 
race and racism” (Opratko & Müller-Uri, 2014: 1), and one that is being answered differently in different 
countries. In Germany, for example, the 2011 “Deutsche Islam Konferenz, a state agency initiated by the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, rejected the term ‘Islamophobia’ in favour of the neologism 
‘Muslimfeindlichkeit’ (‘hostility towards Muslims’)” (Opratko & Müller-Uri, 2014: 3).  
2
 Though see Richardson (2011, 2013, 2015) and Richardson & Wodak (2009a, 2009b) for analysis of fascist 
esoteric arguments. 
3
 For an extended analysis of these and other leaflets, see Richardson & Colombo (2014) 
4
 Given copyright restrictions, we cannot include images of these leaflets in this chapter. We therefore point 
the reader to the following links: http://imgur.com/2UL5xV5 ; http://imgur.com/gsuY7c9  
5
 See the silhouettes of missiles in this article, for example: http://www.scienceclarified.com/Ro-Sp/Rockets-
and-Missiles.html (accessed 27 April, 2015). 
6
 The video of the interview is available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/ktla-anchor-
apologizes-mistaking-samuel-679048. We would suggest watching it before reading our analysis of the case. 
7
 White phosphorous is a self-igniting and therefore highly incendiary chemical substance which the Israeli 
army claim to use as an obscurant. However, due to the fact that it used it within densely populated urban 
areas and that white phosphorous can by definition be used with little precision, it arguably led to many 
avoidable civilian casualties (Human Rights Watch 2009; also see Kaposi 2014, 2016). 
8
 Incidentally, the paragraph is preceded by the following thoughts: “Israelis grieve as all humans do for the 
children cut down in Gaza’s maelstrom, and their leaders know full well the damage that this conflict is doing 
to the country’s reputation, especially where images of Palestinian suffering are broadcast more as 
propaganda than news.” (The Times, 16 January – emphasis ours) Again, we witness the emergence of 
suspicious figures who are defined not by any positive motive (i.e., by their genuine interest in Palestinian 
suffering) but by their clear and inexplicable animosity towards the State of Israel. 
